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REVIEW ESSAY 
ARE JUDGES MOTIV A TED TO CREATE "GOOD" 
SECURITIES FRAUD DOCTRINE? 
Donald C. Langevoort* 
How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does-
Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, by Stephen M. 
Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati, I confronts the reader with a theory about 
judicial behavior in the face of complex, "unexciting" cases such as those 
involving securities fraud. The story is simple: few judges find any 
opportunity for personal satisfaction or enhanced reputation here, so they 
simply try to minimize cognitive effort, off-loading much of the work that has 
to be done to their clerks.2 The evidence that Bainbridge and Gulati offer is 
the creation of some ten or so "heuristic" legal doctrines in securities law 
marked by two essential features: (1) they rest on superficial, or at least not 
self-evidently accurate, empirical assumptions about marketplace behavior, 
and (2) they readily permit the summary dismissal of cases "as a matter of 
law.,,3 The authors find no good explanation for these besides some form of 
cognitive sloth.4 
This claim is bound to touch a sensitive nerve, especially among judges, 
former clerks, and academics who want to see much more going on in the case 
* Professor of Law. Georgetown University Law Center. I should say at the outset that I consider the 
Bainbridge and Gulati article an extremely impressive work of scholarship, and hope to make clear why 
herein. Any particularly critical tone detected by the reader should be read mainly as self-serving on my part. 
Psychological research shows that people are considered smarter when they make critical comments as 
opposed to supportive or constructive ones. See Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Smart Talk Trap, 77 HARV. Bus. REV. 
134 (May-June 1999). 
J Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else 
Does--Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002). 
2 !d. at 100-11. 
3 Id. at 118-19. 
4 Id.atlll-12. 
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law than this. My hunch is that the authors have put their finger on something 
very important, but that they have oversimplified. I suspect that, on average, 
judges are more motivated than they suggest and try fairly hard to get their 
cases right. But severe constraints of time and lack of knowledge force them 
to rely more on intuition about the right result than careful inquiry. Intuitively, 
the heuristics identified by Bainbridge and Gulati appeal to the judges as 
substantively reasonable, in the sense that even if they are imperfect, they do 
more good than harm. The question this commentary explores is what makes 
judges think that. The answer is not likely to be simple. 
I. 
Because Bainbridge and Gulati's theory is so provocative, it is easy to 
overlook the immense contribution to the securities law literature that they 
make simply by cataloging and dissecting the doctrines. Scholars have taken 
note of some of them-for example, "puffery,,5 and the "bespeaks caution 
doctrine,,6 -and demonstrated the shakiness of their specific intellectual 
foundations. For the most part, however, these critiques have treated these 
doctrines as outliers in an otherwise rational securities fraud regime. By 
contrast, Bainbridge and Gulati demonstrate that a large cluster of doctrines 
have been infected by a single strain of a judicially spread virus? Moreover, 
they tie these doctrines to an aggressive methodological move by the courts, a 
willingness to dismiss cases as a matter of law even when they pose subtle 
questions of fact and inference.8 Consider the puffery case of Eisenstadt v. 
Centel Corp.,9 where the "Herculean" Judge Richard A. Posner determined 
that a company was not making a material misrepresentation when it stated 
that an auction of telecommunications assets it was conducting was going 
"smoothly." In fact, the auction process was thus far a serious disappointment, 
though Centel was still hoping for a good end. Judge Posner said that a 
reasonable investor would understand that "smoothly" coheres with "dis-
appointingly," if not "disastrously.,,1D While this conclusion may be right (I 
am not sure by any means), it is rather stunning for Judge Posner to conclude 
5 See. e.g., Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the 
Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J 1697 (1998). 
6 See Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution." 49 Bus. L. 481 (1994). 
7 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note I, at 119-36. 
8 [d. at 118-19. 
9 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997). 
10 /d. at 745. 
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that this inference is so clear that no reasonable juror could possibly think 
otherwise, the standard test for dismissal as a matter of law. Bainbridge and 
Gulati discover many mutations of this same genetic pattern. II 
There are other commonalities among these doctrines. First, and most 
intriguingly, they are largely inventions of the mid- to late-1980s and early 
1990s. Puffery, for example, was declared "all but gone the way of the dodo" 
by Louis Loss in the early 1980s,12 before its stunning resurrection. Bespeaks 
caution has its roots in a 1986 Second Circuit decision,13 and by the early 
1990s had become a standard defense-side weapon. 
Second, the doctrines evolved in a common fashion. The first cases were 
highly fact-specific and not terribly controversial. Even a "wannabe" can get it 
right in deciding that defendants should not be held liable for not disclosing 
some particular risk factor if, elsewhere in the same document, they did indeed 
caution the reader about that very kind of risk, which is how the bespeaks 
caution doctrine began. So, too, with puffery. It is not laziness by which a 
judge concludes that investors should not be able to sue E.F. Hutton based on 
nothing more than the old advertising slogan "When E.F. Hutton talks, people 
listen.,,14 But gradually, judges become far more aggressive in the way they 
draw inferences "as a matter of law" that terminate plaintiffs' cases, as in 
Eisenstadt. 
Another observation, admittedly anecdotal, is important, too. Anyone who 
reads securities fraud cases in bulk notices that while these heuristics are both 
powerful and (often) troublesome, they do not always dominate. That is to 
say, many judges who write securities fraud opinions seem to work hard at 
their cases, presenting lengthy factual analyses even when the result they reach 
is dismissal. And there are numerous cases where the heuristics are rejected 
and the claim is allowed to go forward, even when the heuristics plausibly 
could be invoked. Any theory of judicial behavior in the securities fraud area 
has to explain a voluminous work product as well as the apparent shirking. 
II Bainbridge & Gulati. supra note I, at 119-36. 
12 See loUIS Loss, fuNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA nON 717 (2d ed. 1988). 
13 Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986). 
14 Zennan v. Ball. 735 F.2d 15,20-21 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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II. 
Clearly, something curious is happening in the rapid embrace of the 
defenses. The question is what. An odd feature of the Bainbridge and Gulati 
article is that while it says it is drawing on the literature on human cognition 
and bounded rationality, it makes no effort to tie its analysis to any of the 
known heuristics or biases that psychologists find so robust. IS The heuristic 
defenses are not themselves identifiable forms of cognition; they are naIve 
inferences that are the product of some deeper form of bounded rationality. 
Because the authors never identify any underlying subconscious psychological 
process that would lead to an embrace of the defenses, they can be read as 
suggesting that judges deliberately shortcut their cases to save cognitive effort. 
To that, we would expect strong objection. Those who know federal judges (as 
well as the judges themselves) will swear that, with notable exceptions, judges 
are not shirkers, but instead committed to deciding cases on the merits best 
they can, if not always expertly. 
I take the authors' claim, however, to be not that judges purposefully 
shortcut their cases, but simply that they act as if that is what they are doing. 
This is the economist's standard move. If so, I can supply the missing 
psychological mechanism, for here is one place where cognitive psychology 
bolsters the economists' orthodoxy. People are prone to self-serving inference, 
enabling them to see as normatively "reasonable" what is really just utility-
maximizing. 16 That is to say, an easy case can be made that judges convince 
themselves of the desirability of the heuristics on the merits, but are biased in 
this construal when the incentive is to shirk. For this reason, the good faith 
protestations of judges and their former clerks do not alone undercut the 
plausibility of the authors' claim. 
In this spirit, let me offer a slight modification of the authors' story that 
seems less insulting to the judiciary but still captures their thrust. Assume that 
judges have substantially differing dispositions toward securities cases, with 
some highly motivated, some uninterested, and many in between. A defense is 
initially recognized, as I suggested above, in common sense form, perhaps 
even by the most motivated of judges. Thereafter, however, it is adopted and 
extended by a mindless judge or two. What happens then is that precedent 
15 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note I, at 90. Cf. Chris Guthrie et aI., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELLL. REV. 777 (2001). 
16 E.g., George Lowenstein et aI., Self-Serving Assessments oj Fairness and Pre-trial Bargaining, 221. 
LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993). 
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builds that gradually attracts more of those in the middle. This attraction is 
mainly because of the institutionally legitimate pull of precedent, aided by only 
a slight dose of self-serving inference. As the attraction grows, the precedent 
gradually becomes more a self-fulfilling prophecy and begins to crowd out the 
efforts of the more diligent judges. 17 In fact, this strikes me as an apt 
description of the doctrinal reality described earlier, wherein many judges 
today are explicitly critical of the heuristics and much hard work still gets done 
in securities cases, but those heuristics gradually exert more and more strength 
disproportionate to their logic as the case law evolves. In other words, one 
need not make strong assumptions about slothful judicial dispositions to get the 
effect we observe: a mild tendency in the judiciary as a whole is enough to 
generate a perceptible bias in the law over time. 
Thus, Bainbridge and Gulati have convinced me that cognitive sloth is a 
sizable part of the story. But they want it to be the story, and dismiss all other 
possibilities. Here is where they stumble a bit. Two aspects of the proof 
disturb me. First, why would these doctrines emerge and spread so quickly 
from 1985 to 1994 if the story is simply about judicial slack? What happened 
at that particular time to trigger a contagion of laziness?18 Second, why would 
appellate judges be as enamored with the heuristics as trial judges? Trial 
judges surely have an incentive to shortcut their cognitive effort by adopting 
heuristic forms of reasoning. On the appellate level, however, the incentive 
structure is less clear, even if we assume a low level of interest in the subject 
matter. Again, consider the puffery defense, which gained its new life largely 
through an appellate decision, Raab v. General Physics Corp.19 Treating 
something as immaterial puffery does indeed cut short the thinking process. 
But from the standpoint of the appellate judge, it is just as convenient to rule 
that materiality is generally a question of factual inference on which trial 
judges should take a restrained posture. Having said that, any unresolved 
factual matters would be remanded for further proceedings. If factual findings 
have been made, they can be reviewed deferentially. In other words, the 
appellate court does not have to do much more thinking in a non-puffery 
regime than in one where the doctrine is embraced. But appellate courts were 
the lead inventors of puffery and its doctrinal siblings, all of which tilt the law 
in defendants' favor. 
17 For a related perspective, see Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 s. CAL. L. REV. 87 
(1999). 
18 Obviously, this could correlate with an increase in judicial workload during that time. Bainbridge and 
Gulati offer no evidence along these lines, so we can only speculate. 
19 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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These two doubts lead to a third and more general concern with the 
authors' theory. Their theory is that the judges are conserving cognitive effort, 
as opposed to undertaking hard work. That hard work, apparently, is that of 
figuring out how investors really react to things like puffery and cautionary 
warnings, or what motivates managers to mislead. However, Bainbridge and 
Gulati concede at many places in their article that even the best economics 
scholars have not been able to answer these questions, notwithstanding 
exhaustive research. If so, the judges could try, but it would hardly be 
productive. The heuristics may thus just be their educated guesses about 
whether plaintiffs' theory of harm has merit, motivated not by laziness but by 
the frustrations of imperfect information. 
For these reasons, I am drawn back to the more conventional explanation 
that Bainbridge and Gulati work so hard to reject-a shift in the ideology of 
the judiciary leading to a pronounced pro-defendant bias. The standard 
account of securities fraud jurisprudence is that its unrestrained growth years 
lasted until 1975, fueled largely by Supreme Court and Second Circuit 
jurisprudence (with respect to the latter, at least, a time and place where 
securities law seemed clearly to be a priority of the judges2o). That ended with 
the advent of the Burger Court and its famous set of "retrenchment" 
decisions.21 The fact that the heuristic case law was the product of a decade 
that began right after these strong signals were sent by the Court is consistent 
with the view that the lower courts-their ranks now filled with the Reagan 
and Bush appointees of the 1980s-were simply extending an ideological shift. 
In response, the authors simply state that there is no evidence that judges 
care enough about the securities laws to spread their ideology to it, and that 
institutional constraints prevent judges inclined to try from straying too far 
from prevailing norms.22 The former claim is impossible to assess one way or 
the other without better data, though I speculate below. As to the latter, the 
obvious response is that there was a norm shift that changed perceptions of 
what open-market securities fraud cases were all about. In this regard, I don't 
want to confuse ideology with simple political labels like liberal or 
conservative. Rather, it is a socially conditioned belief about who the good 
20 For an interesting account. see Margaret Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: 
The Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777 (1997). It would be interesting to test whether 
particular locations today (e.g., the Southern District of New York) are less prone to using heuristic reasoning 
because of the relative importance of the financial world there and the cultural proximity of judges to it. 
21 E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
22 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note I, at 96-98. 
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guys and the bad guys are in a particular domain, and of the virtue of assertive 
legal protectionism favoring one side or the other. Along these lines, a variety 
of factors may have changed perceptions of what is normatively legitimate in 
securities law policymaking. One is the Supreme Court's dramatic shift, which 
could easily trigger a reevaluation among lower court judges of what the 
constraining norms were or should be. The Court expressed, and many 
scholars and others gradually concurred, that class actions in the securities area 
could readily be speculative and thus in need of more careful judicial 
winnowing prior to discovery?3 The tarring of the plaintiffs' securities bar in 
informed professional opinion was, for better or worse, a notable intellectual 
feature of the 1980s and 1990s, and could easily undermine any judicial desire 
to bolster their chances. Again, the perceptions on that issue cannot be put into 
simple political categories: it is entirely possible to be fairly progressive and at 
the same time doubt the functionality of the class action litigation system for 
open-market fraud cases.24 All a moderate judge needs is some doubts about 
the merits of securities actions to find winnowing doctrines appealing. Again, 
the heuristic defenses might appeal as reasonable bets: even if they cause the 
dismissal of some meritorious cases, they make up for it in getting rid of 
probably weak lawsuits before the pressure to settle becomes strong. 
Also, the early 1980s brought the emergence of the efficient market 
hypothesis to the forefront of thinking. While I cannot prove that judges either 
understood or approved of the hypothesis, I suspect that the idea that markets 
are extremely difficult to fool-the underpinning of many of the heuristics-
was both accessible and resonant to many judges, especially after the Supreme 
Court's ringing endorsement of the theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson?5 Taken 
seriously, the theory says that judicial policing in this area is unimportant 
except in cases of clear-cut fraud. Hence, judges ought not go out of their way 
to support marginal-sounding claims. Judges may not be skilled enough, as 
Bainbridge and Gulati say, to evaluate the hypothesis scientifically, but that 
would not stop them from having a naIve faith in it, especially if it coincides 
23 For a comparable social constructionist account in the tort law setting, see Michael J. Saks, Do We 
Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1147 (\ 992). 
24 In this regard, it is worth noting how much powerful Democratic support (e.g., Sen. Christopher Dodd) 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 had-enough to override President Clinton's veto. 
Academically, the work of Jack Coffee, generally a proponent of strong securities regulation, was very 
influential in pointing to serious agency cost problems in large class actions. E.g., John C. Coffee, 
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law 
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986). 
2S 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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with some deeper political bias against legal intervention in market trans-
actions or distaste for lawyer-dominated shareholder class actions. 
To their credit, the authors do not dismiss these possibilities entirely. But I 
think they downplay them too much. The rapid appearance and evolution of 
the doctrinal heuristics were probably the product of a desire to minimize 
effort in response to some change in institutional incentives and a shift in the 
socially constructed vision of good securities law policy. Indeed, if self-
serving inference is at work here, it would operate all the more powerfully if 
there are two distinct motivations being served. Trying to disentangle the 
causal strands, however, is much too hard. 
III. 
Bainbridge and Gulati are right to ask why judges should be at all 
interested in their securities fraud cases, or expect to bring anything resembling 
insight to their resolution. Law professors specializing in securities law err in 
assuming that smart people naturally find securities fraud policy issues 
fascinating, and I concede that the ideological pull described above is not 
universal or spread evenly among judges. As to insight, it is certainly true that 
predictions of investor and managerial behavior are difficult and highly 
contested, even among experts. 
But here is another place where the authors' conclusion-that as a result we 
see daunted judges retreating to a posture of profound lack of interest26-
doesn't ring completely true. While the right policy might be hard to fathom, 
even pre-heuristic securities law simElified the underlying set of questions, 
especially those involving materiality. 7 The law asks whether the fact omitted 
or misstated would likely be considered significant by a "reasonable investor." 
26 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note I, at 86. 
27 Besides those explicitly described by the authors as materiality heuristics, there are essentially two 
other groups. The "duty" heuristics deal with whether and when managers must disclose hidden facts. While 
this seems to be disconnected from materiality, it is not. Properly understood, the duty issues in open market 
fraud cases are about whether, in the absence of disclosure, investors could reasonably be said to have been 
misled by the issuer's words, actions, or silence. In other words, like materiality, it is about the appropriate 
interpretation of corporate discourse. See Donald C. Langevoort, Half- Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences 
by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1999). The final set of heuristics are predictions of managerial 
rather than investor behavior. Why the thought process here is different may be that judges consider 
themselves reasonably adept at thinking through, for example, whether selling some shares would give an 
executive the motive to lie to investors. 
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This simple-sounding articulation tempts judges to treat the question as easier 
than it really is and proceed with excessive confidence toward an answer. 
This is particularly so because most judges are investors themselves, and 
many (at least those leaving a successful private practice) have sizable 
portfolios. This alone gives them reason to be more interested in securities 
cases than other technical areas of law.28 It also means that judges have an 
anecdotal base of experience from which to draw, which psychologists tell us 
will influence their normative judgments considerably. That does not mean 
they get it right, of course, because cognitive biases skew these perceptions. 
And I would venture a guess that these biases, too, may help explain some of 
the heuristic doctrines that the authors attribute to judicial laziness. Take a 
case of an alleged material misrepresentation of some soft information. One 
thing to note is that the judge is placed in a hindsight situation: she is likely to 
overestimate the forseeability of the firm's eventual decline in fortunes. This 
by itself may bias her against the plaintiff s claim of unfair surprise, and 
toward victim-blaming. 
More powerfully, the judge is likely to intuit the answer to a materiality 
question by asking herself whether she would have put much stock in the 
publicity. After all, she has made many investment decisions and has a sense 
about how reasonable people do these things. Most successful people, 
however, overestimate their own prudence, caution, reasonableness, etc., 
especially in hindsight.29 It is easy to look at what the firm allegedly said and 
conclude that she would have thought carefully enough at the time not to be 
taken in by corporate spin. And that gets projected onto the mental image of 
the hypothetical "reasonable investor" employed in making materiality and 
puffery determinations. Whether even the judge would really have behaved in 
accord with her own prediction is far from clear, and even if so, she may 
overestimate the number of others who would act similarly (something 
psychologists call the "false consensus effect.") I suspect that lawyers in 
particular are prone to self-attributions that overweight the level of caution and 
skepticism they bring to their decisionmaking and thus to their construals of 
reasonableness, partly because lawyers are socialized to value caution and 
28 I would add that, during the 1980s and 1990s, there arose a broad cultural fascination with the process 
of investing, as so much money was made in the sustained bull market, a fascination to which the judiciary 
could hardly be immune. And at the risk of speculating too much, the wealth created by this market may have 
blinded people (including judges) to the risks therein, lessening the perception of a need for strong regulatory 
intervention. 
29 See Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 881-83 (1995). 
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skepticism so highly. If judges display these egocentric "lawyer's biases,,,3o 
their embrace of heuristics like puffery and bespeaks caution on both 
normative and descriptive grounds should hardly be surprising. It is easy for 
the judge to suspect that the investors' claim of fraud is really just a risk gone 
bad, or of foolish greed getting the better of good judgment. Political 
conservatives are especially inclined to discount psychological excuses and 
project onto the world an unrealistic level of intentionality.3l 
I do not put this forward as the whole story of judicial behavior in 
securities cases, just as a further complicating factor. Judicial investment 
experience does strike me as a good reason why judges are somewhat more 
interested in and confident about securities questions than Bainbridge and 
Gulati suggest. On the other hand, it does not help explain why the heuristic 
doctrines took hold so suddenly in the 1980s and 1990s; I will assume that 
judges have long been prone to these perceptions. But if we add to the total 
mix the emergence of a socially constructed belief of frequent meritIess 
litigation in the securities area, and of the market-efficiency driven vision that 
paternalism is unnecessary in open-market cases because smart money so 
dominates the price-setting function, norms that might otherwise check these 
biases weaken considerably. In that setting, giving voice to the biases is easier. 
In the end, then, Bainbridge and Gulati have convinced me that the 
institutional incentive structure in a world of heavy caseloads itself inclines 
judges to think less hard than they should about their securities cases. Just as 
important, they have also uncovered a body of evidence that cries out for 
explanation. While I doubt that their behavioral theory explains quite as much 
as they say, it is, at the very least, a compelling invitation to look deeper into 
the judicial mind for why securities law has evolved in the curious way it has. 
30 Langevoort, supra note 6, at 494. 
31 See Philip Tetlock. Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure 
Depend on the Politics o/the Beholder? 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293 (2000). 
